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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
17627

-vsPHILLIP FRANCIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted of burglary, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-202 (1953), as

amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted without a jury on
February 13, 1981 in the Second Judicial District Court before
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist.

On February 27, 1981 appellant

was sentenced to 1-15 years at the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment and
sentence rendered by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 30, 1980, Wayne Vandenakker reported to
Washington Terrace Police in Weber County that his home had
been burglarized (T.10).

When police investigated the scene,

Mr. Vandenakker told them the names of individuals

regularly were around the house (T.29).

who

That same day, Officer

Richard Cope and Officer Dean Jensen questioned appellant at
the Washington Terrace City building concerning the burglary
(T.29,50,85).

Officer Cope, before questioning appellant,

advised him of his Miranda rights (T.29).

After indicating

that he understood his rights (T.29), appellant discussed with
Officer Cope the burglary and his activities on April 29th,
the day of the burglary (T.30-31).
During the interrogation, which lasted about 1 1/2
hours, the police asked appellant if he would take a polygraph
test; however, they informed him that he had a right to refuse
(T.44-49).

Appellant did refuse to take the polygraph on this

and other occasions

(T.102).

Appellant did not confess during this initial
interrogation (T.31).

However, approximately thirty minutes
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after he was allowed to leave, the police received a call
from an unknown individual, who stated that there was a
package for Officer Cope in a garbage bin of a local business
(T.32).

Officer Cope retrieved the package and found some

of the missing items from the Vandenakker house (T.33,34).
On May 1, 1980,0fficer Cope briefly talked with
appellant at his home concerning the burglary.

Appellant

again reiterated that he had no information concerning the
crime (T.40).
On May 8, 1980, appellant voluntarily came to the
police station, where the police conducted a third interrogation
(T.46,54).

Four

policemen; Officer Cope, Officer Jensen,

Sergeant Powell and Chief Tracey; conducted the interrogation,
each of the officers taking turns questioning the appellant
(T.47).

During this interview, which lasted about one hour

and forty five minutes (T.46), Officer Jensen told appellant
that they would try and work something out with the County
Attorney if he would talk (T.86).

Appellant responded that

he did not commit the burglary and that he did not want to
talk about it at all (T.88).

The officers withdrew their

offer to talk with the County Attorney and allowed appellant
to leave (T.88).
There are a couple of references to a fourth

-3-
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interrogation in the record, but no evidence concerning a
fourth interrogation was

ever brought out (T.50,55).

Officer Cope testified that he never gave appellant
any promises in return for a confession (T. 55) nor did he ever
threaten appellant (T.51).

He also testified that appellant

never confessed during any of these sessions (T.55).
From May to November of 1980 the only other contact
the Washington Terrace Police had with appellant was by Officer
Jensen, who stopped appellant a couple of times on traffic
violations in August or September (T. 89).

Officer Jensen told

appellant he would like to talk and that maybe he could do
something about the traffic citations.

When appellant said he

did not corrunit the burglary, Officer Jensen followed through
with the citation (T.89).

Officer Jensen also indicates that

on one occasion he talked to appellant and asked him to take a
polygraph.

Appellant, as he had done in the past, refused to

take the test (T.101).
On November 3, 1980,Appellant was taken into custody
and interrogated by the Ogden City Police on an Ogden City
case (T.59).

Following appellant's arrest he was taken to the

police station, where he was interrogated by Officer Afuvai
(T.59).

Prior to this interrogation, Officer Afuvai advised

appellant of his Miranda rights

(T.59).

Appellant said that
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he was aware of his rights and he discussed the Ogden City
case with Officer Afuvai (T.59).
During this interrogation, Officer Afuvai offered
to drop three outstanding charges against appellant in connection
with the Ogden City case (T.60,61,66).

However, no promises

were ever given appellant in exchange for his confession on
the Washington Terrace case (T.61).
After appellant had confessed in the Ogden city case
and signed a written confession, Officer Afuvai began questioning him about the Wasington Terrace case (T.61).

Appellant

told Officer Afuvai that he had broken into the Vandenakker
house on the 29th of April and had taken some of the missing
property and that he had left the stolen property in a garbage
bin for Officer Cope (T.62,63).
This interrogation lasted about four hours (T.62).
Officer Afuvai testified that he may have raised his voice
during the interrogation, but that the atmosphere was peaceful
and he never cajoled or threatened the appellant (T.64,67,68,
80,83).

Officer Afuvai also testified that appellant never

tried to stop while he was confessing (T.64).
The record also indicates that Officer Afuvai had
questioned appellant prior to the interrogation that led to
his confession (T.68).

Officer Afuvai stated that he had

questioned appellant two or three times while appellant was in
jail, that some of these interrogations involved the Washington
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Terrace case, and that appellant had been advised of his
Miranda rights at the jail (T.68).
Appellant contradicts some of Officer Afuvai's
testimony.

He alleges that Officer Afuvai promised to drop

certain charges if he confessed (T.110,111) and he
testified that Officer Afuvai threatened him by hitching
up his pants and stating, "You're causing me to lose my
composure."

(T.111).

A week after appellant confessed to Officer Afuvai,
he also confessed to Officer Jensen of the Washington
Terrace Police (T.93).

The trial court ruled this confession

inadmissible on the grounds that the defendant believed
it was an off the record discussion.

The court also found

that appellant confessed in order to pacify the police officers.
Nevertheless, the court found the original confession admissible
(T.131,132).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED TO THE
WASHINGTON TERRACE BURGLARY.
The voluntariness of a confession is determined by
reviewing all of the circumstances under which the confession
was made.

State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d 435 (1973).

This Court has stated that it will not disturb the trial
court's ruling on this issue if there is substantial evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to support it.
(1973).

State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 88, 505 P.2d 302

This rule remains the same even though the evidence

presented at trial is conflicting.

Palfreyroan v. Bates and

Rogers Const. Co., 108 Utah 142, 158 P.2d 132 (1945).

Clearly,

the trial court is in the best position to assess the
credibility of the witnesses and to determine what weight
should be given to their testimonies.

On appeal, the evidence

should be viewed in the light most favorable to the lower court's
judgment.

Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512 (Utah 1980).
In State v. Watkins, 219 Kan. 81, 547 P.2d 810

(1976),

the court listed the following factors as bearing on the issue
of voluntariness:
. The duration and manner of interrogation; the ability of the accused on request
to communicate with the outside world; the
accused age, intellect and background; and the
fairness of the officers in conducting the
interrogation . . . Generally if the accused
was not deprived of his free choice to admit,
deny or refuse to answer, the statement may be
considered voluntary.
Id. at 824

(citation omitted).
In addition to the above facts the court in Watkins

pointed to the numerous Miranda warnings the defendant had
received in ruling the confession was voluntary.

The Miranda

warning is designed to assure that a confession is voluntary
and to inform the defendant of his right to remain silent
and his right to have counsel present during questioning.
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Even though proof that the Miranda warning was given is
not dispositve of the issue of voluntariness (State v.
Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977)), it clearly is some
indication the confession was the product of the defendant's
free and rational choice.
In Watkins the court considered the following
facts with reference to the voluntariness of the defendant's
confession.

The defendant was taken to the district attorney's

office at about 3:00 p.m. and placed in the library with
another suspect, who had told the district attorney that
he could get the defendant to tell the truth.

The police

were aware that this individual had fought with the defendant
earlier in the day.

One hour later the police began an inter·

rogation of the defendant which lasted four hours.

During the

course of the interrogation the defendant implicated another
individual, who was brought in to confront the defendant.
Both individuals became hostile and an argument ensued.
Later, a police officer moved close to the defendant and told
him it was "all over" and "it was time to face up to it."
Shortly thereafter the defendant confessed.
The court in Watkins found some of the police
questionable.

cond~t

Nevertheless, the court found the confession

was admissible because it was the product of a "free will and
independent mind."
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The evidence in the instant case establishes that
appellant's confession was voluntary.

When appellant

confessed to Officer Afuvai, he knew that he had a right to
remain silent and to have counsel present.
been convicted of several felonies (T.118).

Appellant has
With this

criminal experience, appellant knew that the police had to
follow certain procedures in conducting an interrogation.
The record also contains numerous accounts of appellant
being advised of his Miranda rights (T.29,59,68).

When

interrogated by the Washington Terrace police, appellant
stated he understood his Miranda and still he talked with
the police and denied any complicity in the burglary (T.30).
Appellant never seemed to be intimidated by the police.
During the third interrogation with the lvashington Terrace
Police, appellant told them he had not committed the burglary
and he did not want to talk about it.

The police then allowed

appellant to leave (T.88).
When appellant was interrogated by Officer Afuvai
a number of factors may have influenced him to confess.
had just been arrested and placed in jail (T.60,68).

The

evidence against him for drug possession, driving with a
revoked license, and for theft in an Ogden City case was
extremely strong.

Finally, appellant's confession in the

Ogden City case may have reduced his resistance and made
him more susceptible to confessing.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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He

During the interrogation appellant never asked to
see anyone, nor did he ever decline to discuss the case with
Officer Afuvai.
Officer Afuvai testified that he never threatened
or cajoled the defendant, nor was the confession made pursuant
to any promises.

He testified that the interrogation, which

lasted about four hours, was peaceful (T.64,67,68,80,83).
Appellant claims that Officer Afuvai is 5 foot 10
inches and 270 pounds (appellant's brief, page 11).

This

information is not found in the record and cannot be verified.
The only reference to Officer Afuvai's size is that he is
an imposing figure (T.82).

Therefore, respondent submits that

this information is not properly before the court and it should
not be considered.
Appellant infers in his brief that the interrogations conducted by the Washington Terrace Police had a
cumulative effect upon him.

However, respondent maintains

that the interrogations conducted by the Washington Terrace
Police were too far removed in time from the interrogation
that led to appellant's confession to have had any coercive
effect upon him.
Appellant also claims that other actions taken by
the police violated his rights.

Respondent submits that many

of the techniques used by the police to elicit information
from a defendant are not proscribed by Miranda.

The police
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are not required to talk in monotones or to maintain
complete neutrality in conducting an interrogation.
The mere fact appellant confessed, when he
knew his confession could be used against him, is not
proof that his confession was involuntary.

As the

Supreme Court said in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568

(1961):
A confession is not always
the result of an overborne will.
The
police may be a midwife to a declaration
born of remorse, relief, or desperation,
or calculation.

Id. at 576.
In the instant case the trial court found that
appellant confessed to pacify the officers (T.131).
However, appellant's confession is not rendered involuntary
by the fact that he was motivated by a desire to appease
Officer Afuvai.

This desire and appellant's free will could

coexist at the same time.
Respondent maintains that appellant was not deprived
of his free choice.

Appellant knew what his rights were; he

knew that he could decline to discuss the case further and he
knew he could ask for counsel.

Appellant clearly had the

choice to confess or to invoke his rights, and he chose to
confess.
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POINT II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT INVOKED
HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, NOR IS THERE
AN ABSOLUTE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST RESUMING
QUESTIONING ONCE THAT RIGHT HAS BEEN INVOKED.
There is no evidence in the instant case which
establishes appellant invoked his right to remain silent.
Appellant postulates from the following facts that this
right was invoked.

Officer Afuvai questioned appellant

three or four times on the day he was arrested.

Two

of the sessions involved the Washington Terrace burglary,
while the other sessions involved other cases.

Finally,

Officer Afuvai advised appellant of his Miranda rights two
times during the course of these interrogations (T.68).
Appellant's counsel speculates that since appellant was
questioned and advised of his rights on two occasions, that he
must have initially refused to discuss the case with Officer
Aluvai.
To adopt appellant's position would be improper.
Appellant's counsel is merely speculating that appellant
invoked his right to remain silent.

There is no evidence in

the record which would support the conclusion.

It is fundamental

that this court will not rule on evidence which is not supported
by the record.
The fallacy of appellant's argument, that since
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Officer Afuvai gave appellant two separate Miranda warnings
appellant must have initially declined to discuss the case,
is also apparent.
The mere fact Officer Afuvai talked with appellant
more than once does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that appellant invoked his right to remain silent.
Appellant could have talked with Officer Afuvai, but
claimed he was innocent.

He had done this on prior occasions

with the Washington Terrace Police (T.31,40).

If this were

the case, subsequent questioning would not have been improper.
In support of his claim that once the right to remain
silent has been invoked the police are proscribed from
resuming questioning,
P.2d 108

appellant cites People v. Pettingill, 578

(Calif. 1978).

In Pettingill, the police on two separate

occasions gave the defendant a Miranda warning and asked him
if he would discuss the case.
refused.

The appellant on both occasions

Three days after the arrest a third interrogation

was initiated by a new officer after a fresh Miranda warning
had been given the defendant.
defendant confessed.

In this interrogation the

The instant case is easily distinguishable

from Pettingill because here there is no evidence that appellant
invoked his right to remain silent.
The position taken by California in Pettingill was
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v.
Moseley, 423 U.S. 96

(1975).

In Mosely the court held that
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under certain circumstances, where the right to cut off
interrogation has been "scrupulously honored," police can
resume questioning without violating the defendant's
constitutional rights.

Respondent maintains that in this

case it would be improper to decide this issue because there
is no evidence that appellant ever invoked his right to
remain silent.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
INTO THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS
ADVISED OF AND WAIVED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS.
Once a defendant is fully appraised of his/her
rights, and those rights are intelligently waived, the police
are not required to repeat those rights each time questioning
is commenced.

People v. Hill, 39 Ill.2d 125, 233 N.E.2d 367,

U.S. cert. den.392 U.S. 396 (1968); State v. Dixon, 489 P.2d
225

(Ariz. 1971); Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118, U.S.

cert. den. 425 U.S. 950

(1975).

The evidence establishes that appellant was aware
of his Miranda rights when he confessed to the crime in this
case.

Appellant has been convicted of several felonies (T.118)

From this fact a general understanding of the criminal justice
system can be ascribed to appellant.

During the course of the

investigation in the instant case, appellant was advised of his
Miranda rights by the Washington Terrace Police and he
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discussed the case without confessing (T.29-31).

On one

occasion appellant even invoked his right to remain
silent by declining to talk to the police '(T.88).

Just

prior to the interrogation that led to appellant's
confession, Officer Afuvai again gave appellant his
Miranda rights and appellant said he was aware of them
(T.59).

In this interrogation the questioning initially

dealt with the Ogden City case.

After appellant confessed

in that case, Officer Afuvai began questioning appellant
about the Vandanakker burglary.
establish that appellant

These facts clearly

was aware of his Miranda rights

when he confessed to the Vandanakker burglary, that he knew
he could invoke his rights and that Officer Afuvai was not
obligated to repeat them before questioning appellant about
the Washington Terrace case.

People v. Hill, 39

Ill~d

125,

233 N.E.2d 367, U.S. cert. den 392 U.S. 396 (1968).
The result might be different in a case where the
defendant is confused, unfamiliar with his rights, or where
a significant amount of time has elapsed between the giving
of the warning and the confession.

However, in this case the

defendant clearly understood his rights under Miranda when
he confessed.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND APPELLANT
VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED.
In State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 88, 505 P.2d 302 (1973),
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this Court stated that it would not disturb the finding of
the trial court that a confession was voluntarily made "where
there is substantial evidence upon which the trial court
could reasonably so find."
613 P.2d 512

In Nielsen v. Chin-Hsein Wang,

(Utah 1980), this Court stated:

The findings and conclusions of the
district court must be affirmed unless
there is a no reasonable basis in the
evidence to support them.
Further, the
evidence and all inferences that fairly
and reasonably might be drawn therefrom
must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the judgment entered.
Id. at 514.
In the instant case the trial court ruled appellant's
confession was admissible (T.132).

Implicit in this ruling

is the fact that the confession was voluntarily made.
though

Even

the evidence presented at trial on the issue of

voluntariness was conflicting, the trial court's ruling will
not be disturbed if there is evidence to support it.

Palfreyinan

v. Bates and Rogers Const. Co., 108 Utah 142, 158 P. 2d 132 (1945)
The evidence in the instant case, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, establishes
that appellant's confession was voluntarily made.

Appellant

was advised of his Miranda rights on numerous occasions prior
to confessing (T.29,59,68).

This fact coupled with appellant's

previous experience with the criminal system suggest that
appellant knew at the time he confessed that he could cut off
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the questioning by invoking his right to remain silent.
Officer Afuvai testified that appellant was never threatened,
nor were any promises made in exchange for a confession
(T.64,68,80).
Appellant points out that the trial court found
he confessed to pacify the officers.

This however does not

mean the trial court found appellant's confession involuntary.
Even though appellant was motivated by a desire to pacify
the officers, the evidence establishes that he was never
deprived of his free choice.
CONCLUSION
There is no evidence in the record that indicates
appellant ever invoked his right to remain silent.

However,

the evidence does establish that appellant made a voluntary
confession.

Officer Afuvai was careful to advise appellant

of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him.

Appellant

clearly understood his rights and therefore Officer Afuvai
was not obligated to repeat the warning after appellant
confessed to the Ogden City case.

Therefore, respondent

urges this Court to affirm the finding of the trial court
that appellant's confession was admissible.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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